Let’s try build a picture to model theism, atheism and agnosticism using the probabilities approach from the previous post. For that we need some statement of theism. Of course this devolves into the problem of definitions, but let me go around it with the following statement which will do for now:
G: there is at least one god. For “god”, take any coherent/non-vacuous definition by any prominent adherent of (and authority in) Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Sikhism, Juche, Judaism, Bahai, Shinto, Cao Dai, Zoroastrianism. So another phrasing for G: at least one coherent/non vacuous definition of god within Christianity…Zoroastrianism corresponds to an entity that exists.
I’m bypassing a lot of definitional nonsense here. I’m not a lawyer so I’m expecting the above to be read charitably. You probably know what I mean even if I didn’t say it. By vacuous I’m excluding things like “God is love” or Karen Armstrong’s definitions of a god and so on. Deistic-like belief in some abstract “god of the philosophers” or anything similar should be covered by G since Christianity includes prominent clergy who in essence talk of the Christian god in that way. If all definitions you’ve seen were incoherent/vacuous and you expect any others you haven’t encountered to be the same, well then your probability of G being true will be low, that’s all. And so on.
Now, to list at the relevant definitions that we’re working on. These are phrased by me but obviously gleaned from elsewhere.
- atheist v1: there are no gods
- atheist v2: does not believe there are gods
- agnostic v1: whether or not there are gods is unknown
- agnostic v2: whether or not there are gods is unknowable
- agnostic v3: whether or not there are gods is uncertain
- theist: at least one god exists
So let’s say you’ve placed a dot that represents your assessment that G is true somewhere on the scale below (last post that argued for the necesity of such a scale). FYI, my current estimate for G is 10% so I’ve also placed an X showing where I sit:
0%__X___25%_____50%_____75%_____100%
I think the assessment of whether you believe G (or not) is based on personal opinion and does not follow from the dot’s placement automatically. How strong must your confidence be before you believe something? This is different for different people. Two people might both put G at 75% but to one of them this qualifies in “believing in” G and to the other it doesn’t. Of course it would be very credulous to believe say everything which has more than 60% chance of being true (in your estimate). On the other hand, 90% might be too high. You probably believe things which to you are less certain than that. But that’s the whole point — our idea of “believing in” is hard to map onto a more accurate probability scale because it’s intrinsically hard to map a two valued simplification onto a more sophisticated model. In the end, the very idea that “I believe” something is a shortcut.
Since I’m writing the blog post I’ll set the number at 75%. So 75%-100% makes you a theist. Interestingly, by symmetry, 0%-25% makes you an atheist v1. This is because the whole scale is symmetric. If you’re only 25% certain of G then it’s just a mathematical fact that you’re also 75% certain of ~G (ie. the nonexistence of gods) which combined with my arbitrary 75% threshold puts you in the “there are no gods” category. So I guess whether I like it or not, I’ve just placed myself into the strong atheist category based on my own model.
What about atheist v2? Well again because in my model to believe in something you have to be 75% sure, a v2 atheist would include EVERYONE from 0% all the way to 75%! This is unintuitive but follows completely from the definitions — so once again I blame the fuzzy nature of our concept of “believing in” something. Or at the very least, what it says is that if you require a reasonably high threshold of evidence to believe something (eg. 75%) then you should consider yourself an atheist if your own estimate for the existence of gods is below that very threshold.
Now, what to do about the 3 versions of agnostics? I will conflate v1 and v3 as speaking of very similar things, but that “certain” speaks of higher probabilities than “known”. Again this reflects our intuitive usage (“I know this but I’m not certain”). But “known” also sounds more sure than simply “believe”. So if I put “believe” at 75%, I will put “know” at 85% and “certain” at 90%. In this case, an agnostic v1 is everyone whose dot on the above scale is from 15%-85%. An agnostic v3 is an even wider band: 10%-90%. Note that this model highlights that gnosticism/agnosticism is orthogonal to theism/atheism. Which is at least a point in the favour of those who claim these things are orthogonal.
Now what to do about agnostic v2? Saying something is unknowable could mean saying that you can’t even estimate a probability for G, or that the probability for G is undefined. But I think that in the type of approach I’m describing, unless G is meaningless it might not even be possible for there to be an undefined probability. Please comment if you know something about this point because I don’t. But in my ignorant opinion, I think for any statement you would simply start at the 50-50 mark and then use external evidence to update your estimate, ie. nudge it to the left or right. So in the absence of any decent evidence you would remain at 50%. If this is true then you would only be an agnostic v2 if your estimate for G is 50%.
There is another interpretation: that the universe is such that we will never be able to get into the “know” bands of the scale. In my case the “know” bands are 0%-15% and 85%-100%. Of course if you say that you are making a claim that’s separate from G. However you are also telling us that your estimate is in the 15%-85% range. Under this analysis, an agnostic v2 is anyone whose estimate is in this range AND who makes the extra claim that no evidence exists in the universe to get to either side of this band.
This whole thing might leave you unsatisfied but I think that’s the point. Folk terms like “believe” aren’t used very consistently by our brains. If we attempt to make their usage precise and consistent, we get unusual results, like my above system classifying you as an atheist (v2) if you are 70% sure that Islam is TRUE. But I think this is as close as we can get to formalising this. If you see anything wrong with the model, have at it!
14 comments ↓
You are approaching the whole matter scientifically. I have no problem with this. But be sure that no religious person would want to even consider your scale. For a true christian, muslim, jew, etc, there is no issue of probabilities. For them, what they believe is 100% true. If they encounter someone who is 1% unsure of the existence of their god, they will classify them as infidel (substitute by appropriate adjective depending to the particular religion).
I feel that the mind is more like hundreds of co-processors feeding a fuzzy logic output circuit. Thus each co-processor has differently weighted beliefs and often contradictory. We are a multitude.
Thus, we change, thus, trying to think of “belief” coming from a homogenous, intentional mind is a mistake.
Takis — so do you consider a religious person who is “only” 90% sure to not be a “true” adherent of their religion? If so it seems a bit like a No True Scotsman to me. I’m also more interested in what you might think about the “scientific” approach as you called it especially its counterintiuitive results.
Also in the last post on your blog you quote yourself as being neither atheist, theist nor deist. Can you explain what you mean by that especially in how it relates to the above?
Sabio — I’m not sure how relevant that is. When I talk about assigning a probability I’m referring to the end result of a very specific process: a certain kind of rationality. I don’t think it’s negated by other processes. For instance even if I get a fight or flight response at a sudden noise in my house at night it doesn’t mean that I assign a significant probability to there being an interuder in the form of a robber/poltergeist etc.
Of course if we talk about belief then you can say that “a part of me believes there’s a poltergeist”. But I think this shows that talking about of assigning probabilities has an advantage over talking about mere belief.
Ah, yes, I agree that using “probablity” is a far better method than claiming “one belief”. I wrestle here (Your Inner Theist) with the mistaken view that we have consistent beliefs. Multiple-Selves is my way of understanding this.
Faith. Childhood indoctrination.
Both ignored by this.
Most religious people are far from certain of their beliefs hence they jump on any nonsense to show them to be true e.g. Turin shroud, Eucharistic miracles, Lourdes etc. etc. Anything backed up by (usually fake) science.
There will be atheists who assign a higher probability to the existence of some kind of god(s) than some religious people.
I don’t think religious belief is really amenable to any consistent scientific metric, even within the same person – religious people will often dismiss ESP but believe in angels, even though there is more ‘evidence’ for ESP.
Michael, it’s not what I consider but what some religious folk do. According to a religion that comes to mind (Orthodox Christianity), even 1% uncertainty of non-existence of god, disqualifies one from that religion.
I do, of course, like assiging probabilities, either in a Bayesian or not fashion. This is what I called scientific.
As for the comment on my blog: I am not a deist, in the sense that deism claims that reason can prove existence of god. I am not a theist, in the sense that theists assume there is a god. I am not an atheist, in the sense that I do not care to prove the non-existence of a god, in the spirit of Russell’s celestial teapot. I don’t know how to call it, but I prefer a stand where it is not at all obvious that one should even care about existence or non-existence of the supernatural. The only reason we do is because people have done so in the past.
Keddaw — a few things:
1. How does this model ignore faith and childhood indoctrination? I don’t see this at all. The model only describes the current state of belief in a religious proposition, not the epistemic/social history of how one has this state.
2. Even if I’d grant that most people would jump on “proofs” of their religion (which I’m not sure), how does this show that they weren’t confident before? I guess it would suggest that their assessment is less than 100% since at 100% they wouldn’t be after any evidence for or against it, but that’s all I can see from this.
3. “There will be atheists who assign a higher probability to the existence of some kind of god(s) than some religious people.” — this is the most puzzling so maybe provide an example? To me it would seem to be a contradiction in terms but your scenario almost says that whether we believe something is completely separate to our assessed probability of it. Which leads to very strange results like “I believe X is true but I think the probability that X is true is onlt 1%”. Unless you think the idea of religious faith is this precise contradiction? But then this would require religious believers to think that their beliefs are probably mistaken which doesn’t sound right either…
I guess what all these points show is how murky the whole subject of the psychology of belief is.
Takis — is there an actual source from any catechism-type text for any religion that says you must not have any doubt at all? Though I don’t know enough about Orthodox Christianity, it seems doubtful to me because the idea of wrestling with and overcoming your doubts as some supposedly-profound experience is such a common trope in religion.
“I am not an atheist, in the sense that I do not care to prove the non-existence of a god, in the spirit of Russell’s celestial teapot.” — so you’re using atheist v1 from this post — but according to my scale you’d still be an atheist! Of course this leads to the other issue of people’s self-identification not being the same as what others might choose to label them as.
1. My belief that my* mother loves me is indifferent to evidence because a) I know it to be true and b) I want it to be true and c) I need it to be true to validate me as a person. Even though she criticizes everything I do and used to beat me as a child.
2. No-one, ever, jumps on dubious evidence of something they already believe 100% to validate what they already believe 100% because there is better evidence which led them to be 100% sure.
3. Karen Armstrong vs David Cameron. Karen Armstrong believes in a deity, gives it all sorts of nebulous and unproveable/untestable traits and then, sorta, calls it Christian. She ‘knows’ it exists for she has intellectually proved** it, whereas David Cameron is an Anglican and doesn’t really believe in ‘God’ but kinda does and not only that he knows so much about him being 3-in-one and born as a human in Jerusalem and killed at Easter (before the eggs?) and raised and ascending into heaven etc. He sorta believes in a specific God but Armstrong believes in an ineffable one. Armstrong is effectively, according to most religions, an atheist who strongly believes in (a) god, whereas Cameron is a Christian who doesn’t really believe in a god but would probably like one to exist.
* My mother was lovely, this is a thought experiment…
** For a wrong definition of proved.
1. Then all this would mean is that you haven’t arrived at your belief by rationality but that’s not related to the scale. I think you’re confusing the rationality of belief with a rational description of a (rational OR irrational) belief.
2. I agree — that’s was the point, it only shows they’re not 100% sure but doesn’t say anything about the rest of the spectrum.
3. Armstrong would be a theist according to the scale I’m talking about. Unless you just disqualify her god for being too vague.
“is there an actual source from any catechism-type text for any religion that says you must not have any doubt at all?”
I’m only speaking from personal experience and reminiscences of 10 years of religious classes at school… It is true that overcoming your doubts and repenting, etc, is part of the process, but I think I remember that a true christian (=orthodox) should have no doubts. Doubts are equal to sin, and in fact, a grave one! Also, I think that most religious christian orthodox people would reply that they’re 100% sure about their beliefs.
I am aware that the above claims are weak as (i) I have provided no references (to catechism texts) and (ii) I have not performed or aware of statistics data relating to the second claim. Please take my claims as hypotheses which I strongly believe to be true (and which are, of course, falsifiable). If I find references, I’ll let you know.
“so youâre using atheist v1 from this post â but according to my scale youâd still be an atheist! Of course this leads to the other issue of peopleâs self-identification not being the same as what others might choose to label them as.”
True. Perhaps my statement expressed my wish: to have religion become irrelevant, in which case, any labels would be strange. I certainly am acelestialteapotist, although celestialteapotism has not been a major theme in humanity’s history, therefore the label is funny. [Of course, I'm aware of the fact that the analogy celestialteapot/religion is not perfect: the latter supposedly appears in order to fulfill humans' needs for explanation of natural phenomena in the absence of science.]
N.B. I wrote this message yesterday and clicked on submit. For some reason, it didn’t go through, so I posted again. I received the message that I’m trying to submit an identical message. I gave up. Today, I saw it hadn’t gone through. Since I did have a copy on my laptop, I’m submitting again.
For some reason it got caught in the spam queue. I check all messages there anyway and don’t just empty it so it should always appear eventually.
It might be true that Eastern Orthodox Christians are more sure than most religions but my point was that overall I doubt most people are at 100%. I’ll have a look at some studies anyway.
On your wish for the idea of atheism not to be needed at all I think you might enjoy this old post by Eliezer Yudkowsky:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/11m/atheism_untheism_antitheism
Ok, based on work by Luke Galen (of the Reasonable Doubts podcast) comparing nonreligious people to churchgoers, it is pretty strong for churchgoers:
‘The churched also were more certain in their certainty, with 95 percent “absolutely” believing in God. Only 32 percent of the CFI group absolutely did not, while 40 percent were “mostly” disbelieving.’
http://www.mlive.com/living/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2009/03/gvsu_professor_luke_galen_find.html
But, based on this I’d think that for religious people who don’t regularly go to church (a fairly large proportion), at least 15-20% would have a belief less than “absolute” — if not more.
Michael, you answered the question you posed to me better than my answer: the post by Eliezer Yudkowsky is brilliant, a true gem! I will link it on my blog for future reference. Thanks a lot.
And let me a bit clearer about the 100% probability of belief for Christian Orthodox (CO) folk. There are several probabilities involved. If you ask a CO, in presence of his spiritual father (SF) [sic] what his probability p of existence of god is he will say p=1. If you ask the SF what the CO’s p is, he will say p=1. If you ask the CO in the absence of the SF, he/she may say, e.g., p=0.95 but he/she will add that he/she is trying to fix this by, e.g., praying. If you were able to probe the CO’s mind and “weigh” his/her doubts, you might conclude that the actual is less, say, p=0.8. Definitely, any attempt to actually collect statistics in order to estimate p would result in a wrong figure.
So, to be clear, when I said p=100% for CO, I meant what a CO is supposed to be and what he/she would tell you in presence of a real (or perceived) SF.
In my experience, from childhood indoctrination, to admit that p < 1 is a sin.
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