From Marginal Revolution, a quote from Brian Caplan that Tyler Cowen asks his readers to discuss:
I confess that I take anti-cloning arguments personally. Not only do they insult the identical twin sons I already have; they insult a son I hope I live to meet. Yes, I wish to clone myself and raise the baby as my son. Seriously. I want to experience the sublime bond I’m sure we’d share. I’m confident that he’d be delighted, too, because I would love to be raised by me. I’m not pushing others to clone themselves. I’m not asking anyone else to pay for my dream. I just want government to leave me and the cloning business alone. Is that too much to ask?
Discussion ensues and here’s Tyler’s followup post criticising the responses
I am disappointed in many of the responses which you offered to Bryan on the cloning question[...]So many of you cited reasons why you didn’t like it, but hardly anyone performed a sober assessment of the relevant trade-offs[...]“I can find some reason to object to this” seemed like a decisive argument. Bryan’s joy in the arrangement seemed to bug the readers all the more; I had the feeling many of you would have found it perfectly OK if he had expressed resignation at something like this being an accidental occurrence[...]As a proud step-parent, I find it increasingly odd how many of you insist on the “fifty percent solution.” Ew! What if it — heaven forbid — looks like you? [...]Most of all, I found this thread to be a lesson in how quickly smart people will side with their Darwinian intuitions, and attack another smart person with intolerance, just because something feels icky to them. It’s not so different from how some people find gay people, and also “what they do,” to be disgusting. They also don’t want gay people to be adopting children because they see that as offensive too. It’s not, least of all for the child.
I agree with pretty much all of this. Similar to my old discussion of incest, I do find something personally icky (or at least strange, to use a tamer word) about this. But whenever I look for an argument against it, the same argument would apply to something that’s not considered objectionable by most. The ickiness itself is obviously not an argument.
You might say Caplan is misunderstanding biology since his identical twin won’t be exactly like him, and could well have a different personality. But that’s just not granting the hypothetical: what if genetic determinism were true? The same question would stand. Plus Caplan could also want to father a genetic copy of himself “just because” — what’s wrong with that?
Those who object that he’s reducing the genetic diversity of the human genepool should make up generic diversity standards and be prepared to enforce them for “traditional” reproduction too. However even then it would be suspicious if someone was fine with say a person marrying a 2nd cousin their whole life but suddenly demands reproductive purity when faced with Caplan. Plus, having kids with your third cousin seems actually better than a more distant relative so even then your reproductive purity laws (guidelines?) will probably have to be a lot more incest-friendly than you like. If concern about the genetic future of humanity is your concern that is.
Not to mention that such concerns are based on a simplistic view of evolution (perhaps even a misunderstanding). It’s not much different to people who lament that by wearing glasses and allowing those four-eyes to reproduce we’re decreasing some abstract “fitness”. We live in a world where glasses are available and they form as much a part of our extended phenotype as dams for beavers and animal skin clothes for our ancestors.
And then there’s this gem: “… because my preferred degree of similarity isn’t so close that it allows me to mistake it for identity.” Again this is missing the point of the hypothetical as the motivation could be changed. But even if there was some “mistake” in Caplan’s preferences, we certainly allow people to have children under mistaken preferences, and would consider the taking away of such a right to be repugnant. Based on my comments above on misunderstanding evolution, it is those who have children because they want to “propagate the species” that are having kids the mistaken preferences.
Can anyone think of any arguments that can’t immediately be shot down by applying them to other reproductive scenarios you’d be loathe to deny?
6 comments ↓
How could I forget one of my favourite quotes of all time in this post?
“If you cloned yourself and had sex with yourself, would that be incest or masturbation?”
-Jen Peeples on the Atheist Experience about 18 months ago.
“And then there’s this gem: “… because my preferred degree of similarity isn’t so close that it allows me to mistake it for identity.â€? Again this is missing the point of the hypothetical as the motivation could be changed.”
I think that is the point of the comment: it’s not cloning per se that is wrong or icky – it’s Caplan’s stated motivation to produce a mini-me.
And I would agree (still assuming I’m interpreting the comment correctly). I see nothing wrong with cloning as a way of reproducing – once the practical wrinkles have been ironed out so that it’s no more dangerous than, say, in vitro fertilization. In fact, I don’t see any reason it should be more controversial than that procedure.
As to the motivation – “mini-me” is probably often enough the motivation for having a child in the normal way. And I don’t think we should start legislating who should have children based on their motivations.
I do think the cloning might provide the illusion of mini-me offspring more powerfully than the usual method, and hence a stronger motivation for those so inclined. But I suspect that illusion will decline once cloning is commonplace and people start to see that a clone is really no different from a child obtained in any other way.
I read the comment about mistaking genetic similarity for identity as an argument as to why self-cloning is wrong (or in the more extreme case, should not be allowed).
However I think we actually agree — the point of bringing up the comment was to point out that similar preferences exist for non-cloning reproduction. So arguing for immorality on the basis of mistaken preferences cuts out a huge percentage of all reproduction.
I don’t even see anything wrong with cloning if the risks haven’t been ironed out. If the patient has informed consent they can and will often take far greater risks in other procedures like cosmetic surgery (of course you can question the degree of informed consent for any medical procedure).
I also agree that increasing people’s understanding of the complexity between evolutions, genetics, the environment, epigenetics etc will only improve our reproductive motivations — whether it’s about cloning or “old school” reproduction.
There is absolutely nothing wrong with cloning yourself – apart from the unbelievable chutzpah of thinking your genes (the unique arrangement of them in you) is so special and valuable that the world cannot do without them.
There is the obvious nature/nurture issue which means that your clone will not be your ‘clone’.
When we reach the stage of being able to clone ourselves then we will also have much more control over our genes, so that premature balding issue could be removed, or many possible health problems could be non-issues for your clone. But… once you start changing the genes for the clones benefit in what sense is it a clone?
I want a clone – but one without a functioning brain so I can harvest the organs as I use my own ones up.
Also, why stop at one clone – why not have an army of you? If you have the funds, pay for loads of surrogates to carry them to term then train them up with you as their supreme leader and take over the world. An army of clones, all pulling for the same outcome would be unstoppable.
Of course that would be the real test – would hundreds of clones, brought up in almost identical situations, actually end up the same? Would there be a bell curve of personalities, abilities and attributes? Does the biochemical environment in the womb make a difference, do the variety of stimulations experienced while in the womb make any difference to the born child or grown man?
It is my opinion that the chaotic nature of the brain means that a slight difference in the experience of a foetus or child would lead rapidly to differentiating factors between clones. Identical twins are much more alike when they have been brought up together than if they are separated at birth – but would they be even more different if they were separated before birth (which is effectively what cloning would show)?
I’m guessing you don’t want a clone then but just stem cell research and engineering.
Also I don’t think it’s more chutzpah than most people who want to reproduce. And again, that is not the stated reason he wants to have a clone.
I’m guessing an army of clones would be on the same bell curve as normal for all measured traits but the curve would be a lot more squished in.
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