Are Moral Statements Arbitrary?

In the previous post, I argued that morality is made up of basic atomic statements (eg. “causing another being to suffer for its own sake is wrong”) that cannot be proved or further broken down into non-moral statements. In a way, I’ve actually argued that metaethics (ie. creating an over-arching system that proves morality) is an impossible enterprise. However, this apparent copping-out seems to present several problems. The first as pointed out in the first comment is how to deal and explain disagreements about morality. That I’ll post on later — today I want to address the other criticism, that this makes moral statements arbitrary or implies a total relativism.

Now, the charge of relativism is readily used by a huge number of opponents of any secular explanations of morality, as if this was some awesome argument that would be enough to destroy any theory of morality. And of course rhetorically it’s a powerful trick: “are you saying you can’t condemn Hitler within your moral system?”. There are two problems with playing the relativism card. The first is that if it really is true that moral statements can’t be proved without moral assumptions then all moral systems are relativist in that none of them can prove that, say, Hitler was immoral. The second problem is one of application. If I was to be murdered, tortured or raped tomorrow, it would probably not be by a moral relativist but a moral non-relativist. And I venture to say that, contrary to the assertions of the religious right, moral relativists do not behave any worse than average. Which would be a very revealing thing about the nature of moral systems.

Of course the classic argument — one that I want to address — is the argument from reverse morality. For this, consider a conversation between myself and a detractor.

Detractor: So you don’t believe morality comes from a god or that it’s derivable from logic, science or anything else other than morality?
Michael: Right
Detractor: And from your previous post you think that morality is absent from sociopaths meaning that it requires some kind of biological motivation?
Michael: Of course. The basis of it all is empathy which has to be hard-wired into you as a motivation. There’s no reason to think you can be reasoned into it.
Detractor: But then doesn’t make morality completely arbitrary?
Michael: What do you mean?
Detractor: I mean we happen to have empathy because we evolved it. So it’s the mere luck of our evolutionary history, right? We could have evolved anti-empathy instead, in which case the protagonist of your previous little dialogue would have been wanting to torture the puppy and it would be the sociopath who would want to stop them!
Michael: Well, as the great Jack McCoy from Law and Order once said, if things were different they wouldn’t be the same.
Detractor: That was a cheap answer…
Michael: On the contrary, I think it shows that you’ve answered your own question. If we were all perfectly malevolent then we’d be perfectly malevolent. And then, no logical argument alone could dissuade us from our malevolence.
Detractor: Well then — aren’t we lucky we drew the right evolutionary card!
Michael: Are you saying it’s by chance?
Detractor: Well, if we could have been perfectly malevolent.
Michael: Well herein lies the problem. According to you, morality is some abstract label you can just attach to any action — as if the morality of an action was something supernaturally above and beyond is real-world consequences. But I think that although it’s conceivable that we could have evolved to be perfectly malevolent, the presence of empathy is no coincidence. I mean is it a coincidence that a species with the most powerful mind on earth thus far evolved as a social species with complex relationships, rather than as a solitary species?
Detractor: No.
Michael: And is it a coincidence that within complex social networks, the strategy of altruism (even if it’s reciprocal altruism) might happen rather than a complete war of all against all that’s less manageable?
Detractor: No.
Michael: And is it a coincidence that within complex social networks, we’d evolve the mental machinery to learn from others by putting ourselves in their place? And that this same mental machinery is essentially what empathy (or at least the rudiments of empathy) is?
Detractor: No, of course not. But then again, aren’t you engaging in some just-so stories and speculation? Couldn’t there just as well be other planets where morality evolves completely differently? Haven’t you read Three Worlds Collide?
Michael: Right, and yet I don’t see how any intelligent species can evolve without the principle of empathy, even if it’s implemented in a vastly different way than ours. Combine that with logic and things might not be so arbitrary at all.
Detractor: And if you can’t?
Michael: Well what difference would it make? Even if everyone in the universe was malevolent would that change anything for you? If you were born with the biology of a normal human, this morality is what’s part of your life — you have no choice!
Detractor: And yet something is definitely missing from this picture…

More on why I think it looks like something’s missing later.

5 comments ↓

#1 keddaw on 02.24.10 at 2:41 am

Lots is missing from this picture…

We evolved from social animals, but they evolved from non-social animals and we have some vestigial morality/survival instinct from them.
We grow up surrounded by parents and friends and take much of our early morality from them.
We grow up in a society that has norms (often historical) and punishes those that step outside of those and praises people who adhere giving us yet another level of morality.

The main problem here is that we have a whole host of moral systems within the brain, all competing to tell us what is right and only one can ever win in a given situation. And above all those we have our intellect trying to decide if it is moral if the ends justifies the means or should we have absolute moral rules…

Metaethics is not impossible, but it requires an agreement of the aim or purpose that is possibly not grounded in morality. In fact, the only system I can think of which would adapt to a cohesive and consistent form of morality would be a Pareto optimal one where no action can be performed if it decreases the well being of any individual. But even then you’re assuming humans are worth more than other animals, or that animal life is worth more than plant life, or that living matter is worth more than non-living matter.

I await your way to bring all these points together.

Incidentally, everyone can criticise Hitler from within their own moral spheres but they can’t criticise him from within his own (i.e. he wasn’t immoral in his own mind). But that’s fine as very few people are in that moral sphere and those that are tend to not spout too much about morality anyway.

#2 Melliferax on 02.24.10 at 3:51 am

Nitpick on keddaw’s comment: We didn’t evolve from social animals, we ARE social animals. And I wouldn’t say we have “vestigial” survival instincts (by which I assume you mean selfishness and immoral behaviour), but rather that even though we and other social animals have evolved some sense of empathy and justice, we’re still basically selfish. Most people will cheat at some things if they know they can get away with it, just like most other moral animals do. This isn’t “vestigial” but an important part of our genes making sure we do as well as we can to allow them to survive another generation!

Anyway – great couple of posts, am looking forward to the next installment…

#3 keddaw on 02.24.10 at 1:06 pm

Anti-nitpick on Mellifrax’s comments…

We did evolve from social animals AND we are social animals.

The vestigial instincts are the ones that I can’t name as such creatures don’t exist any more, but I imagine things like killing the offspring of a new mate if they’re not yours, taking advantage of a situation rather than being empathetic etc. would probably be from parts of the brain borne of a more selfish time. Not all of those instincts are with us, but some remnants of them and their ilk are.

Sorry, but sometimes I am less than obvious and have to define my position more clearly…

#4 Melliferax on 02.24.10 at 10:43 pm

keddaw – Fair enough. Most people when they say “we evolved from X” mean this to imply that we are no longer X but Y or Z or something else entirely.

As for killing the offspring of a new mate, there’s evidence that people are much more likely to mistreat (and kill) step-children than their own… which makes perfect sense from an evolutionary point of view although obviously when your partner is a thinking, feeling human being with moral values it’s kinda hard to get away with killing their babies.

All that’s a side point though. I think I get what you mean. ;)

#5 Marc on 02.25.10 at 12:00 am

I agree with Keddaw’s first statement: Lots is missing from this picture…

For starters, you don’t really answer the question. I take it we are to conclude from your reasoning that moral statements aren’t arbitrary. But you don’t make a very clear argument as to why this is so.

Although I agree with what you are (probably) trying to say, that there can be moral statements that can be deemed to be true or false, it’s not very clear how you reach this cunclusion.

Secondly, you state: “The basis of it all is empathy which has to be hard-wired into you as a motivation. There’s no reason to think you can be reasoned into it.”

Why does empathy have to be exclusively hardwired? As Keddaw rightly pointed out: a lot (maybe most) of our ‘empathy’ is a result of our upbringing in a certain environment. This nature vs. nurture debate is hardly a done deal, but I think we can safely say that both play a role in our moral upbringing.

So you can’t be reasoned into it, but you can be praised, rewarded, punished and condemned into (or out of) it.

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